William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 2

Article 9

1999

The Influence of the Minnesota Tobacco Trial on
the Healthcare Community and Tobacco
Regulation
Richard D. Hurt

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Hurt, Richard D. (1999) "The Influence of the Minnesota Tobacco Trial on the Healthcare Community and Tobacco Regulation,"
William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 25: Iss. 2, Article 9.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Hurt: The Influence of the Minnesota Tobacco Trial on the Healthcare Co

THE INFLUENCE OF THE MINNESOTA TOBACCO
TRIAL ON THE HEALTHCARE COMMUNITY AND

TOBACCO REGULATIONt
Richard D. Hurt, M.D.tt
......................................... 455
II. THE CIGARETTE - A TWENTIETH CENTURY EPIDEMIC ........... 461
III. THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE ............... 462
I.

THE MINNESOTA TOBACCO TRIAL

IV. THE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM AND TOBACCO ............................. 464
V. WHAT CAN WE Do BETTER? .................................................. 468
I. THE MINNESOTA TOBACCO TRIAL

The purpose of this article is to provide information on the
current status of the healthcare community's involvement in the
tobacco and health issue and how we might better interface with
the political and legal systems to help control the epidemic of tobacco-caused diseases.
The legacy of the trial, and the more than thirty-three million

t This essay is based on a speech Richard D. Hurt, M.D., gave at William
Mitchell College of Law's Center for Health Law & Policy symposium titled, "Tobacco Regulation: The Convergence of Law, Medicine & Public Health."
tt
Richard D. Hurt, M.D., is director of the Mayo Clinic's Nicotine Dependence Center. He has served as a consultant and expert witness for the State of
Minnesota and Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minnesota since 1995. Dr. Hurt is
board-certified in internal medicine and addiction medicine, and he is active on a
number of smoking cessation and nicotine addiction boards and centers. He first
came to the Mayo Clinic in 1973 and has served as professor of medicine at the
Mayo Medical School. He graduated with a BA. from Murray State University and
received his M.D. from the University of Louisville, Kentucky.
1. Before getting into the particulars of this issue, I want to acknowledge
that my participation in the Minnesota tobacco trial (State ex re. Humphrey v. Philip
Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 8, 1998)) was one of the highlights of my career. Working with people like Michael Ciresi, Roberta Walburn,
Gary Wilson, Susan Nelson, Tara Sutton, Corey Gordon, Roman Silberfeld, Michael Berens and many others was an opportunity of a lifetime. Attorney General
Hubert H. "Skip" Humphrey, III, and his team (Tom Pursell, Doug Blanke and
Luanne Nyberg, among many others) also deserve credit as the driving forces behind this case.
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pages of documents that have now been released to the public, 2 will

carry on long after the money from the settlement' has been spent.
It is the public health community's hope that the contents of these
documents will become widely known. In a peer reviewed article
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, Dr.
Channing Robertson and I reported on some of the documents
that we used for the trial.4 The focus of the article is on documents
about addiction, low tar/low nicotine cigarettes, cigarette design,
and nicotine manipulation.5 We wrote the article because we believe it critical for the community at large to be aware of the evidence introduced in this trial and to understand the actions and
behavior of the tobacco industry. The trial documents should be
used to protect the public health by helping shape national policy
toward the tobacco industry.
A central issue that the industry continues to deny is that they
sell a drug delivery device (cigarettes) which delivers an addicting
drug (nicotine). 6 Though nicotine's addictive properties were acknowledged internally by the tobacco industry in the early 1960s,
they publicly denied this.

The basis for that public denial was

made clear in a 1980 Tobacco Institute document from Mr. P. C.
Knopick to Mr. W. Kloepfer, senior vice president for public rela8
.
tions: Shook, Hardy [& Bacon, LLP, is a Kansas City,9 Missouri, law
firm that has directed legal strategy for the industry ] reminds us,

2. See State ex rel.
Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, slip op. at
2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 14, 1995) (establishing a depository for "timely and efficient
control and management of discovery in this action").
3. See Henry Weinstein, Big Tobacco Settles Minnesota Lawsuit for $66 Billion,
L.A. TIMES, May 9, 1998, at Al.
4. See Richard D. Hurt, M.D. & Channing R. Robertson, Ph.D., Prying Open
the Door to the Tobacco Industry's Secrets About Nicotine, 280 JAMA 1173, 1173-1181
(1998).
5. See id. at 1173.
6. See generally Stanton A. Glantz et al., Looking through a Keyhole at the Tobacco
Industry: The Brown and Williamson Documents, 274 JAMA 219 (1995) (documenting
tobacco industry strategies employed to avoid products liability litigation).
7. See id. at 220.
8. See Trial Exhibit No. 14303, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (memorandum from P.C. Knopick to W. Kloepfer, Tobacco Institute, dated Sept. 9, 1980) The trial exhibits cited herein are
available at a website provided by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota. See
<http://www.mnbluecrosstobacco.com>.
9. See Peter Hanauer et al., Lawyer Control of Internal Scientific Research to Protect Against ProductsLiability Lawsuits: the Brown and Williamson Documents, 274 JAMA
234 (1995) (discussing how the tobacco industry's attorneys have responded to the
threat of products liability litigation arising from smoking induced diseases). See,
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I'm told, that the entire matter of addiction is the most potent
weapon a prosecuting attorney can have in a lung cancer/cigarette
case. We can't defend smoking as 'free choice' if the person was
addicted."' °
Proclaiming smoking to be a matter of free choice is another
of the industry's long standing ?ublic relations tactics called the
"wrap yourself in the flag" ploy, which involves promoting the
"free choice" concept as being the American way and intertwining
that message with freedom and other civil rights.12 The acknowledgement of the addictive nature of nicotine was found in hundreds of documents. Sir Charles Ellis, a scientific advisor to British
American Tobacco ("BAT"), in a 1962 document stated, "What we
need to know above all things is what constitutes the hold of smoking, that is, to understand addiction." 3 Others were more blunt,
such as a 1978 Brown and Williamson memo: "Very few consumers
are aware of the effects
of nicotine, i.e., its addictive nature and
•
,,14
that nicotine is a poison.
Many documents spoke to the issue of
the threshold dose of nicotine, such as a 1980 Lorillard document
summarizing the goals of an internal task force, one of which was
to, "[d] etermine the minimum level of nicotine that will allow continued smoking. We hypothesize that below some very low nicotine
level, diminished physiological satisfaction cannot be compensated
for by psychological satisfaction. At this point smokers will quit, or
return to a higher T&N' 5 brands." 6
Perhaps the most surprising finding in our document review
e.g., Lisa Bero et al., Lawyer Control of the Tobacco Industry's External Research Program:
the Brown and Williamson Documents, 274JAMA 241 (1995) (examining the tactics of
the tobacco industry lawyers, who used selected research project results to influence public policy).
10. Trial Exhibit No. 14303, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
31-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.).
11. Victor Crawford, A Personal Revelation by a former tobacco lobbyist, Address at the American Society of Addiction Medicine's Eighth National Conference on Nicotine Dependance (Oct. 14, 1995).
12. See id.
13. Trial Exhibit No. 11938, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (publication entitled "The Effects of Smoking: Proposal for Further Research Contracts with Battelle," BAT, dated Feb. 13, 1962).
14. Trial Exhibit No. 13677, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (memorandum to M.J. McCue entitled "Future Consumer Reaction to Nicotine," dated Aug. 24, 1978).
15. Presumably, "T&N" denotes "tar" and "nicotine".
16. Trial Exhibit No. 10170, State ex reL Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (internal tobacco company memorandum dated Feb.
3, 1980).
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was evidence of industry-wide efforts spanning three decades to alter the chemical form of nicotine to increase the percentage of free
base nicotine delivered to smokers. 17 Outside the industry little was
known about this, and even in testimony before Congress, cigarette
company CEOs denied that the industry manipulated nicotine,1 8 a
position defended in testimony in the Minnesota tobacco trial by
Mr. Geoffrey Bible, CEO of Philip Morris. 19 Mr. Bible also expressed surprise and shame at a survey performed for Philip Morris
in 197420 where children fourteen or younger were being interviewed about their smoking behavior.
He expressed the same
feelings 22 about a 1979 Philip Morris document which said amongst
other things, "Marlboro dominates in the 17 and younger category,
capturing over 50 percent of this market," 3 and a 1975 memo entifled, "The Decline in the Rate of Growth of Marlboro Red."24 In
this latter memo, author Myron Johnston states, "Most of these
studies have been restricted to people age 18 and older, but my
own data, which includes younger teenagers, shows even higher
Marlboro market penetration among 15- to 17-year-olds.,
Despite
a trial exhibit entitled, "Young smokers-prevalence, trends, implications, and related demographic trends," which contained the
statement, "This report deals with only one of these trends-teenage smoking and attitudes toward smoking together with related
demographics,
his testimony demonstrates that Mr. Bible remained somewhat defiant:

17. See Hurt& Robertson, supra note 4, at 1175.
18. See Jeffrey Taylor, Tobacco Firm Releases Data About Nicotine, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 2, 1998, at A20.
19. See Transcript of Proceedings, State ex rel.
Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 89675, at *1-*34 (Minn. Dist. CL Mar. 3, 1998).
20. See Trial Exhibit No. 10497, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (A study by The Roper Organization, Inc. of
smoking habits among young smokers datedJuly 1974).
21. See Transcript of Proceedings, State ex rel.
Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 89675, at *5 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 1998).
22. See id. at *6-7.
23. See Trial Exhibit No. 11808, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.).
24. See Trial Exhibit No. 2557, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (memorandum discussing the decline in the
Marlboro Red brand growth rate, dated May 21, 1975).
25. Id.
26. Trial Exhibit No. 10339, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (industry report dated Mar. 31, 1981).
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Q. Do you think it is good for Philip Morris to be reporting to a number of people within the company, including
people in management, about average daily consumption
of teenage smokers, not even teenagers, 12 to 18?
A. No, I don't think that's appropriate, sir.
Q. You're ashamed of that, aren't you sir?
A. Well, I'm ashamed of it, but I don't know the circumstances under which this was done. 27
Mr. Bible apparently urged Thomas Osdene (retired Philip
Morris research scientist) to tell the truth and not plead the Fifth
Amendment: 2s "First and foremost, the company wants the truth
told. " 2 Osdene pleaded the Fifth Amendment numerous times
during his deposition when confronted with internal documents. °
One document was in Osdene's own handwriting and concerned a
Philip Morris research laboratory in Cologne, Germany, in which
he wrote, "Ship all documents to Cologne. We will monitor in person every two to three months. If importantletters or documents have31
destroy."
to be sent, please send to home. I will act on them and
It would have been fascinating to have heard the truth from Osdene, but he availed himself of his constitutional right against selfincrimination. We are, however, free to draw the obvious inference.
Though most view the documents as the true legacy of the
trial, the industry has tried to put a different spin on their importance. Dan Donahue, a senior vice president and deputy general
counsel of the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, has recently
downplayed the importance of the documents. He remarked that
the documents show only that the tobacco industry is filled with

27. Transcript of Proceedings at 6143, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris
Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 88330, at *21 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3,1998).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("[N]o person shall... be compelled ... to be
a wimess against himself.").
29. David Shaffer, Ex-tobacco Researcher Takes Fifth During Tria4 ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 14, 1998, at Al.
30. See id.
31. Trial Exhibit No. 2501, State ex. reL Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (undated list detailing what was to be done with the
internal tobacco documents).
32. See David Hanners, Tobacco Suit's Legacy Yet to be Seen, Now Settlement Spent,
Uses of the Once-Secret Industry Archives are Key, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 30,
1998, at Al.
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people who write a lot of memos. 3 He is quoted as saying, "The
best way to deal with [the many memos] is not on a document-bydocument basis, because any and every industry is going to be peopled by people who write down dumb things. We have historically
taken the position of 'Don't
look at what people wrote down, but
34
look at what was done."

It is difficult to conceive of how such a senior official at R.J.
Reynolds could so cavalierly try to dismiss the documents, especially
those like the report to the board of directors of R.J. Reynolds on
September 30, 1974, entitled, "1975 marketing plans presentation,
Hilton Head, September 30, 1974.",3 In this document, one of the
key opportunities to accomplish the goal of re-establishing R.J.
Reynolds' market share was to "increase our young adult franchise
....,,36 The report provided: "First, let's look at the growing impor-

tance of this young adult in the cigarette market. In 1960, this
young adult market, the 14-24 age group, represented 21 percent
of the population. ' , 37 Does Mr. Donahue expect us to believe that a
presentation to his company's board of directors was written by
"people who write down dumb things?"
In a 1980 R.J. Reynolds document entitled, "MDD Report on
Teenage Smokers (14-17)", a future CEO, G. H. Long, wrote to the
38
CEO at that time, E. A. Horrigan, Jr. In this document, Mr. Long
is lamenting the loss of market share for the 14- to 17-year-old
smokers to Marlboro: 9 "Hopefully, our various planned activities
that will be implemented this fall will aid in some way in reducing
or correcting these trends." 4° One wonders if Horrigan and Long
would agree with Mr. Donahue's assessment about the people who
wrote internal memoranda. Mr. Donahue also ignores the fact that
the documents released as part of the Minnesota tobacco trial
spanned the industry and several decades and were often written by
or presented to the highest officials in the companies. The "dumb
people" defense is meaningless, particularly if one judges the in33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Trial Exhibit No. 12493, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (dated Sept. 30, 1974).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Trial Exhibit No. 13101, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
CI-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (memo datedJuly 22, 1980).
39. See id.
40. Id.
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dustry's intelligence by the success of their business.
II. THE CIGARETTE - A TWENTIETH CENTURY EPIDEMIC
Hemisphere for
Tobacco has been a part of life in theS Western
41
as long as there has been recorded history. However, cigarettes
were not popularized until the twentieth century.42 In the late
1800s, cigarettes were beginning to be mass-produced, but even as
recently as 1905, fewer than four billion cigarettes were consumed
in the United States.43 Camel, the first modern cigarette (a blend of
Turkish, flue-cured, and burley tobacco), was not introduced and
mass-marketed by R.J. Reynolds until 1913.44 By 1915, consumption
of cigarettes had risen to more than seventeen billion ciga45
rettes/year and to almost ninety billion/year by 1925. It was not
until much later that cigarette-caused diseases began to be a major
health problem. The prototype of these diseases is lung cancer,
which prior to 1900 was a rare disease. 46 One early specialist, A.M.
Adler, wrote in 1912: "On one point, however, there is nearly complete consensus of opinion, and that is that primary malignant
4
1
neoplasms of the lungs are amongst the rarest form of disease.
As the number of lung cancer cases began to rise in the 1930s,
many theories were advanced as to causation, including influenza,
syphilis, tuberculosis, inhalation of irritating gases such as war gas
or exhaust fumes, or inhalation of radioactive dust.4 Two future
giants in medicine, Alton Oschsner and Michael DeBakey, were
emphatic when they called attention to the cigarette as a possible
etiologic factor: "It is our definite conviction that the increase in
the incidence of pulmonary carcinoma is due largely to the increase in smoking, particularly cigaret (sic) smoking, which is universally associated with inhalation."4 9

41. See William D. McNally, M.D., The Tar in Cigarette Smoke and its Possible Effects, 162 AM.J. CANCER 1502 (1932) (providing a brief history and early analysis of
tobacco consumption, including cigarettes and cigars, between 1905 and 1931).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See generally Alton Oschsner & Michael DeBakey, Carcinoma of the Lung,
42 ARCHIVES OF SURGERY 209 (1941) (discussing actual and theoretical causes of
lung cancer).
47. Id. at 209.
48. See id. at 214-18.
49. Id. at 221.
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One report noted that by 1955, lung cancer had become the
leading cause of cancer deaths in American men, and by 1988 surpassed breast cancer as the leading cause of cancer deaths among
American women.50 In 1994, lung cancer accounted for 91,825
deaths in American men and 57,535 cancer deaths in American
women.5 ' Thus, together, lung cancer accounted for almost
150,000 American deaths in 1994, and for American women in par52
ticular, this number continues to rise. The report projected that,
by 1998, lung cancer would account for thirty-two percent of cancer
deaths in American men (compared to thirteen percent of American men dying from prostate cancer) and for twenty-five percent of
cancer deaths in American women (compared to breast cancer
Tocausing sixteen percent of cancer deaths among women).
bacco-related diseases (heart disease, emphysema, lung cancer,
etc.) account for nineteen percent of all American deaths each
year, making it the leading cause of preventable death in our country.54 Overall, over 400,000 Americans die of tobacco-caused diseases each year. 55 It has been estimated that tobacco-related ill56
nesses cost the U.S. economy over $130 billion each year.
What is not counted in any of these figures is the incalculable
morbidity that accompanies tobacco-caused diseases or the suffering on the part of patients who acquire them and their families
who have to see the ravages of these diseases in a loved one. Historians in the twenty-second century will look back upon this time in
our history and wonder why our society allowed this to happen.
They will be hard pressed to believe it was only about one thingmoney.
III. THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY'S POLITICAL INFLUENCE

Given all the revelations of this industry's misdeeds brought
out in the Minnesota tobacco trial, how then has the industry managed to keep the upper hand? Is it only about money and the in-

50.

See Sarah H. Landis et al., Cancer Statistics, 1998, 48 CA. CANCERJ. CLN. 6,

8 (1998).
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. SeeJ. Michael McGinnis & William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the
United States, 270JAMA 2207, 2208 (1993).
55. See id.
56. See Smoking Illnesses Cost U.S. $130 Billion, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1998, at AS.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss2/9
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fluence it can buy? Certainly that is part of the answer. However, it
is ultimately more basic than that. The industry has developed a
highly sophisticated and coordinated public relations effort which
is extremely well-financed. It had its beginnings in the 1950s with
the issuance of "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers." 57 The in58
fluence extends to decision-makers at all levels. For example, the
Tobacco Institute targeted the Minnesota legislature for an intensive lobbying effort in 1985 because of the very progressive efforts
in Minnesota to control smoking.9 A Tobacco Institute e-mail
stated:
Since Minnesota has seen fit to designate itself as Surgeon
General Koop stated, "a model for the country" with regard to anti-smoking legislation, our only choice in this
matter is a complete victory. Anything less could be used
against us in other states. We will employ all means to secure that victory. 60
The lobbying influence reaches the highest levels of government as evidenced by internal Philip Morris documents relating to
former Senator and former White House Chief of Staff Howard
Baker and his activities as a lobbyist:
On July 3, 1989, Senator [Howard] Baker completes his
one year "cooling off" period during which he could not
by law lobby his former employer. Since he will now be
able to play a more active role in our government affairs
programs, I think it is timely to suggest ways he can most
effectively complement our activities.

57.

See Trial Exhibit No. 14145, State ex re. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,

No. C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (Tobacco Industry Research Committee advertisement addressing unfavorable medical research, dated Jan. 4, 1954); Trial Exhibit No. 14127, State ex reL Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565
(Minn. Dist. Ct.) (Tobacco Industry Research Committee Meeting progress report
dated Jan. 18, 1954, detailing advertising activities).
58. See Trial Exhibit No. 14488, State ex re. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc.,
No. C1-941-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct) (e-mail memorandum summarizing industry
lobbying activities in Minnesota).
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Memorandum from Jim Dyer of Philip Morris Management Corp. to
David Greenberg and Kathleen "Buffy" Linehan, also of Philip Morris Management Corp. (June 29, 1989).
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The document then goes on to describe Senator Baker as "a
unique intelligent source", a "high level advocate", a "master
strategist", and a "goodwill ambassador. 6 2 "Because of his great
stature both as a senator and chief of staff, Senator Baker enjoys access that few Washingtonians can ever hope to achieve." 63

"Sena-

tor's Baker's attachment to this company gives us an effective high
level advocate of our policies."6 In a subsequent memo dated
March 8, 1990, from Jim Dyer, the director of Philip Morris's Governmental Relations Office, concerning Lewis Sullivan, the secretary of Health and Human Services, "Senator Helms further complained about Secretary Sullivan's statements, only to be 65assured
that Sullivan did not speak for the administration formally."
Recent evidence of the power of the industry came to light in
1998, with a bill sponsored by Senator John McCain which would
have significantly increased the price of cigarettes and put into
66
place an effective tobacco control program.
This bill was de
feated67 after the industry spent millions on intense lobbying, including an extensive national television ad and media ad campaign.
They killed the McCain Bill with a simple message that was repeated over and over. That message was that the McCain Bill represented increased taxes, more big government and was not about
preventing kids from starting to smoke. The industry chooses its
messages carefully and then puts them out in a repetitious and
convincing manner to the public. Mr. David Bernick, lead lawyer
for Brown & Williamson, summed it up well in his opening statement in the Minnesota tobacco trial: "Listen to our positions carefully. They were carefully crafted. They mean a specific thing." 6
IV. THE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM AND TOBACCO
What, then, is the current status of the healthcare system as it
relates to tobacco, and what more could be done to enhance that
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Memorandum from Jim Dyer to David Greenberg, Philip Morris Management Corp. (Mar. 8, 1990).
66. See Bob Hohler, Senate Kills $1.50 Cigarette Price Hike, BOSTON GLOBE, May
21, 1998, at Al.
67. See id.
68. Transcript of Proceedings at 1116, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris
Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 36945, at *30 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 27, 1998).
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system and more closely collaborate with the legal system? The
Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations in
the early 1990s mandated that there be smoke-free policies for
hospitals.69 That has been a slow and tedious process, but such
policies have been very effective in encouraging smokers to stop
smoking. These policy changes actually have brought us back to
the norm because hospitals did not always allow smoking. In 1952,
Dr. LennoxJohnston wrote in the British journal Lancet, lamenting
the fact that smoking was encroaching in to areas where it previously was not allowed such as the drawing room, bedroom, work71
room, place of entertainment.
In recent years, the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research has developed and disseminated
a science-based set of
S72
guidelines for smoking cessation. Unfortunately, there are few intervention services that are available in medical centers throughout
the country, and there is a lack of reimbursement for these intervention services. Hopefully, this will change in the future because
if better reimbursement is available it is more likely that intervention services will be provided. While prevention is important and
we should continue to work toward this end, intervention is a key
factor to rapidly reducing the toll of tobacco-related diseases.
When a smoker stops smoking, the chances of having a heart attack
are reduced dramatically in the first few years, and with continued
abstinence, the risk of developing cancers related to smoking are
also significantly reduced. Thus, providing smoking cessation services are
among the most cost-effective medical interventions avail73
able.
From a research perspective, the National Institutes of Health
("NIH") devotes a disproportionately small amount to tobacco disease research than the importance of the problem dictates. 4 For
example, tobacco-related research accounts for about 1.1% of the

69. See Kenneth P. Offord et al., Effects of the Implementation of a Smoke-Free Policy
in a Medical Center, 102 CHEST 1531 (1992).
70. See id.
71. See Lennox M.Johnston, Cure of Tobacco-Smoking, LANCET 480, 481 (1952).
72. The Smoking Cessation Clinical Practice Guideline Panel and Staff, The
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research Smoking Cessation ClinicalPractice Guideline,
275JAMA 1270 (1996).
73. See Ivan T. Croghan et al., Cost-effectiveness of Treating Nicotine Dependence:
The Mayo Clinic Experience,72 MAYO CLIN. PROC. 917 (1997).
74. See John R. Hughes & Anthony Liguouri, A Critical View of NIH Research
Funding on Smoking, TOBACCO CONTROL (forthcoming).
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NIH budget, 75 but as cited earlier, smoking-related deaths account
for nineteen percent of all deaths in the country.76 The total dollars spent by NIH for tobacco-related research in 1995 was $92 million.
Contrast that with AIDS. There have been approximately
400,000 Americans to die of AIDS since 1982, and as noted earlier, over 400,000 Americans die each year of tobacco-related diseases.79 Throughout the Department of Health and Human Services for 1997, there will be almost $7 billion spent on AIDS research
and treatment. 0 At NIH alone, $1.6 billion are devoted for AIDS
research in 1998 with $153 million for AIDS vaccine research.8'
Because of this kind of commitment to research and treatment, the
deaths from AIDS in the U.S. peaked around 1995 and have begun
to decline.8' That shows the potential for an effective, well-funded,
research program at the national level even for a deadly and seemingly hopeless disease such as AIDS. A similar approach is needed
for tobacco.
In medical education, we also have not done a very good job
because there is no real focus in our medical schools for tobaccorelated diseases, prevention, or intervention services. Most of the
topics have to do with tobacco-related diseases, and they are scattered throughout the curricula of medical schools. Specifically,
there is no requirement for intervention training. For a substance
which causes so much death and disability, there is a need for more
emphasis in our medical schools and postgraduate training programs.
Tobacco issues also do not do well in the medical literature.
Though there have been tens of thousands of articles about tobacco-related diseases in the last fifty years, most have been written
in journals of lesser stature and lower impact. The New England
Journal of Medicine has the highest impact factor of 22.7 but publishes very few articles on tobacco, amounting to approximately five
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83

The Journal of the
articles out of 574 articles published per year.
American Medical Association, with an impact factor of 5.3, publishes
thirty two articles about tobacco out of 992 articles published per
year, while Lancet, with an impact factor of 15.2, publishes six per
853 articles per year.8
There is also a fair amount of apathy amongst healthcare providers when it comes to this issue. When readers were asked what
they wanted from a general medical journal, tobacco-related diseases and tobacco itself ranked fifty-fifth.8 Topics such as computers, obesity, clinical practice guidelines, alternative medicine, etc.,
were in the top ten cited as topics of interest.86 Tobacco rated
number twenty-four amongst topics that editorial experts felt that a
87
Managed care, death
general medical journal should address.
and quality of care were in this group of exand dying, genetics,
88
perts, top ten. Some of the apathy may be the relative pessimism
that providers have about the ability of smokers to stop smoking
but has also been influenced by the tobacco industry's carefully
crafted public relations effort, which promotes smoking as a matter
of choice, i.e. the "wrap yourself in the flag" tactic. In court and in
public, the industry spokespeople say that since over 50 million
Americans have stopped smoking, it is simply a matter of choice
and that smokers, when they really want to stop, can do it. Those
of us who treat patients know that simply is not the case for most
smokers. Furthermore, most smokers begin as teenagers who may
choose to smoke those first cigarettes but certainly do not choose
to nor believe they will become addicted.
Finally, there is no organized or focused effort on lobbying this
issue. Presently, the lobbying efforts concerning tobacco are
spread across multiple organizations, and there is not one that focuses only on tobacco. Furthermore, lobbying by the healthcare
industry has to do mostly with healthcare financing and/or regulations. In addition, there is not a constituent group that can bring
lobbying efforts to bear such as has been done with AIDS or breast
83. See Anthony Liguori & John R. Hughes, Where is Smoking Research Published?, 5 ToBAcco CONTROL 37, 38 (1996).
84. See id.
85. See George D. Lundberg et al., A Comparison of the Opinions of Experts and
Readers as to What Topics a GeneralMedicalJournal (JAMA) Should Address, 280 JAMA
288, 289 (1998).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
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cancer. It is puzzling why some organizations, specifically women's
organizations, have not taken smoking forward as an issue since it is
such an important health risk for women, and it is clear that the
tobacco industry targets women for their products.
V.

WHAT CAN WE Do BETTER?

What, then, can be done to improve the tobacco prevention
and cessation efforts from the healthcare community? First, the
healthcare community needs to confront head-on the tobacco industry's main message that smoking is about choice. We need to
develop a consistent counter message and adopt the industry tactic
of repeating that message over and over again. Clearly, cigarettes
are a drug delivery device and deliver an addicting drug. It is also
clear that most smokers start smoking as teenagers, a fact that the
industry has known and exploited for decades. Teenagers who
start smoking may have chosen to do so but they do not choose to
become addicted. That happens because of nicotine, the drug.
Secondly, there is a need to intensify and focus our lobbying
efforts across organizations much like the tobacco industry has
done through the Tobacco Institute. The companies have all gotten together and provided resources to the Tobacco Institute which
speaks with one voice, gives out clear messages, which are repeated
over and over again. Perhaps the voluntary organizations such as
the American Lung Association, the American Cancer Society and
other healthcare organizations should learn from the industry
about how to implement a unified effort. A taskforce made up of
members from these two groups plus the American Medication Association, the American College of Cardiology, the American College of Physicians, etc., could be called together to work out the details. By combining forces they might be able to launch an effective
lobbying effort.
Thirdly, as with AIDS research, there is a need for a permanent office at NIH to coordinate tobacco research throughout
NIH.
Fourthly, Congress should increase the tobacco tax to fund
more NIH research for tobacco control, treatment of tobaccorelated diseases, and intervention services. A tax increase not only
could be used for funding such activities, but it is well-known that
increased taxes or prices of cigarettes also reduce consumption and
reduce start-ups by young people. Though there is published data
on this, perhaps the most telling data comes from the tobacco inhttp://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss2/9
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dustry documents themselves. In a letter from Myron Johnston to
Jon Zoler at Philip Morris on September 3, 1987, on the subject
"Handling an excise tax increase," Johnston laments the fact that
the round of price increases in 1982-83 "caused two million adults
to quit smoking and prevented 600,000 teenagers from starting to
smoke.... We don't need to have that happen again." 89 A tax increase combined with an education and research program, including mass media, grassroots and community-based efforts, has enabled California to reduce the smoking rate to about eighteen
percent, second only to Utah. 9°
Fifthly, we should petition editors of high-impact journals,
such as The New EnglandJournal of Medicine, to take a more active

role in not only publishing tobacco-related articles but also encourage them to be more proactive in this very serious public health
problem. We also need to develop and implement a standard curriculum for tobacco in our medical schools which would include
prevention and intervention services.
Finally, it is clear that members of the healthcare community
need to work more closely with the legal profession to bring about
reform of the tobacco industry. Providing expert advice on addiction and the health consequences of smoking is within the realm of
many health care professionals' competence. Health care professionals should be encouraged to serve as witnesses in lawsuits
against the industry. An important factor that will influence the
ability of attorneys to recruit expert witnesses will be the assurance
that the attorneys will adequately prepare the expert for deposition
and trial.

89. Trial Exhibit No. 11591, State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
C1-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) (Myron Johnston memo to Jon Zoler, Philip Morris
Inc., Sept. 3, 1987).
90. See Taxes, Religious Beliefs Affect Smoking Rates, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER,
Nov. 6, 1998, at A22.
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